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Forests are capable of the best and the worst when greenhouse gases are at stake. Their
controversial contribution for helping developed countries to reach their emission
reduction targets is largely responsible for the November 2000 failure of the Kyoto
Protocol being enforced in the near future. Regarding the unit price of emission credits
for fossil fuels, future transactions for carbon offsets associated with land use change
and forestry projects may well reveal market discounts due to risks and uncertainties
related to their evaluation and management. The author proposes to apply these market
discounts for assessing at intergovernmental level the ‘contributive’ value of forestry
activities eligible for meeting countries’ emission reduction targets.
This proposal is preceded by an outline of the position of the forestry projects within the
Kyoto treaty, as well as by an outlook on the establishment of a market for carbon
offsets. Indications are given for correcting emission reductions and removal
assessments by adjustments that are required when assuming that the ‘true’ contributive
value of one CO2-e ton to be retained may vary (1) according to the uncertainty degree
associated to evaluations and (2) that this degree is closely related to project features
and origins.
Fixing consensual rules for consideration and quantification of uncertainties associated
with carbon uptakes and removal evaluations, including market appraisals as a last
resort, has the potential of moving international negotiations from divergences in the
eligibility of activities towards verification and penalty, in short to policing the Protocol.
The chances for the treaty to be effective and successful would then be enhanced.
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1 Introduction
Some countries have accepted the text of the Kyoto Protocol under the specific
provision of including sinks, as this offers prospects of actually helping them to fulfill
their commitments. More and more complex definitions of carbon offsets have been
proposed for avoiding accounting tricks and loopholes. Aware that ‘science could not
bring them any further’, negotiators are now trying to strike a deal on a quantitative cap
for carbon sequestration ― a drive that has its own problems (among which the
equitable allocation of admissible projects and derived credits in the context of
restricting activities). Not yet completely disregarded by policy makers, discounting for
sinks by some means also opens prospects of searching for a necessary arrangement in
accounting for enhancing carbon sequestration activities.2
Various ways are presently proposed for addressing the issue of the qualitative selection
and quantitative restriction of sink activities; they have the common trait of resorting to
market forces. Expected market discounts for the removed carbon regarding the
reduction unit price of energy projects are approached and applied here in the context of
the probably inescapable conversion of the national-issued emission permits into credits
acceptable for compliance at intergovernmental level. Alternative solutions, with a
more explicit reference to the environmental and social integrity projects, consist, for
example, of installing a specific market for quality-ranked carbon sinks that are
submitted to an auction procedure within the constraint of a politically-decided
quantitative cap (Obersteiner et al., 2001). These various proposals share a common
feature: they aim at self-regulation and decentralizing the decision-making process,
thereby intending to reduce the seemingly unresolvable complexity of the sink problem
significantly.
1 The French version of this paper can be accessed on the Internet at the author’s personal web site
“Forêts et Dérivés (F&D)”: http://www.dplanet.ch/users/agabus.
2 A pragmatic selection of LULUCF activities and specific measures for dealing with carbon sinks are
proposed by Barral et al. (2000), with brief considerations on their pros and cons in accounting for
emission reductions (includes a reference to “discounts” and “carbon loans”).
22 Importance of Forests for Containing Greenhouse
Gases Emissions and Motivation for Finding a Way
Out of the Sinks Issue
Over the past 150 years, deforestation has contributed an estimated 30% of the
atmospheric build-up of CO2 (WRI/IUCN, 1998). Tropical deforestation alone accounts
for about 20% of total greenhouse gas emissions (Chomitz, 2000). The carbon offset
strength of forests is however impressive. Over the past 35 years the mean yearly sink
of Russian forests is estimated at approximately 240 million tons, whereas fossil fuel
emissions amounts to 650 million tons (Nilsson et al., 2000; Obersteiner et al., 2000a).
The carbon sink of trees in all European Union (EU) forests, reaches 63 million tons per
year, compared to 880 millions tons from anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions
(Liski et al., 2000). This is almost as much as the emission reduction target of the EU
under the Kyoto Protocol. These figures indicate that forests and land use changes are
both part of the problem and part of the solution of climate change.
Should the Protocol be enforced, forest activities would however qualify for credits only
if they are directly human induced since 1990 (the so-called ‘Kyoto forests’ defined by
Article 3.3), i.e., established on land that has not been forested (afforestation) for a long
time or on land that has been historically cleared (reforestation). Carbon in other trees,
including naturally occurring native forests and replanting of areas that were forested in
1990, would not qualify. Carbon enhancement practices and measures against hazard
releases in sustainably managed forests (in line with Article 3.4) could also be
considered, but are controversial because of pending restrictive definitions.
Curiously, the forest conservation organizations3 are particularly reserved for including
carbon sequestration activities, especially when forests are at stake. In their revised
global forest strategy, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) state: “Governments must not abdicate their
responsibility to reduce emissions at source by relying too heavily on the capacity of
forests to sequester carbon” (IUCN/WWF, 2000). This is a mild statement compared
to the position taken by the Director of WWF’s Climate Change Campaign: “The only
way to combat climate change is through deep cuts in emissions of global warming
gases” (Morgan, 2000). The US government, in its submission to Article 3.4, is
suspected by a number of environmental groups of accounting tricks when proposing
that forest activities such as nutrient fertilization, fire management, pest management
and rotation length changes (for enhancing carbon storage or avoiding releases) should
count for reduction targets; according to such groups, this would not require additional
efforts to sequester carbon, but would rather give credit for those activities that have
been underway for many years (NET, 2000).
Reducing concentrations of atmospheric carbon is considered as potentially cheaper via
forests than via direct emission reductions at the source. A common estimate is that
carbon will have a market price of US$ 10–30 per ton. The cost of producing carbon
may be far less than this. A report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
3
‘Curiously’ because they usually favor and support initiatives aiming at giving more economic and
social value to forests as a means to help their preservation.
3(IPCC) quotes costs between US$ 0.1 and 28 per ton in pilot carbon projects (Asquith,
2000). Thus important (although sometimes diverging) economic interests are at stake.
Kyoto forests have a differentiated bearing for participants. In the most forested
countries of the EU (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden) the carbon
sink of trees accounted for under Article 3.3 is minor, or the trees are even a carbon
source. Land use change by afforestation or reforestation may seem therefore irrelevant
as a means of achieving the reduction targets of carbon dioxide emissions in these
countries, which account for 85% of the actual carbon sink of trees in the EU forests as
a whole. However, Article 3.3 may have relevance for the carbon budget of individual
countries: for instance, the carbon sink can be significant in countries where the present
forest area is relatively small, leaving large areas available for afforestation and
reforestation. For example, in Ireland and Portugal, the carbon sink of trees accounted
for under Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol was estimated to be equal to 7% of the
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions (Liski et al., 2000). An example of another
substantial potential contribution is that 22–36% of the required US emission reductions
by 2010 could be derived from significant increases in forest and soil carbon stocks in
applying a loose definition of Article 3.4 (NET, 2000).
Finding a way out of the forest issue that is currently blocking the implementation of the
Kyoto treaty is then highly needed. Different strategies for arriving at some kind of
compromise on forest sinks are currently devised: share limits in countries’ assigned
amounts, risk and uncertainty levies, mechanisms for insuring indefinite sequestration
(Chomitz, 2000).
The flexibility allotted by the Protocol with emission trading could also offer some
possibilities. As a way of reducing the cost of cutting global warming pollution,
international trading also gives opportunities for regulations. With reference to the
expected unit price of emission credits for fossil fuels, future transactions for carbon
offsets associated with land use change and forestry projects may well reveal market
discounts due to risks and uncertainties related to the evaluation and management of
such projects. This discussion paper proposes to apply these market discounts for
assessing and registering at intergovernmental level the contributive value of forestry
activities eligible for meeting countries’ reduction targets.
3 Main Features of Forestry Projects Aiming at Removing
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and Implications of the
Impermanence of their Storage Ability
Forestry projects, as a class, are sometimes considered as facing more difficulties than,
e.g., energy projects in producing greenhouse gas emission reductions that are real,
measurable, and additional. As for the assessment of their removal/uptake ability,
storing pools would not be symmetrical to releasing pools. In contrast to preventing
emissions, it would be difficult to assess whether a sinks project has resulted in a net
gain for the atmosphere. For example, if a country receives credit for not logging one
tract of forest but the demand for timber means logging occurs elsewhere anyway, there
is no overall benefit to the atmosphere. Known as “leakage”, this could present a severe
4problem, especially if the rules for the Kyoto treaty allow sinks projects in developing
countries (according to WWF, 2000).
Baseline determination (i.e., the projection of a ‘business-as-usual’ situation required
for assessing eligible gains by difference) would also be controversial. Baseline
estimations for carbon storage are sometimes considered as less reliable than those for
emissions. Predicting the hypothetical without-project level is inherently difficult. The
assessment of gains by technology-induced emission reductions is relatively trivial
when changes of the existing situation are obvious with the definitive surrender of a
given technology by introducing another more performing one. However, with some
projects, the adoption of new processes or equipment would have taken place in any
case (with or without Kyoto constraints), rendering such projects void for achieving
reduction targets. By contrast, the assessment of carbon gains from planted trees on
degraded forest land (where natural regeneration is unlikely over a few decades unless
assisted) is easier to assess since the without-project situation is rather clear.
When considering criteria such as baseline and additionality determination, leakage
assessment, and the measurement of actual emissions or sequestration, it has been
shown that it is difficult to find generic distinction between forestry storage projects and
energy emission reduction programs (Chomitz, 2000). The major difference between
the two lies in that sinks are not permanent carbon stores. Carbon stored in trees is
easily released back into the atmosphere through fires, pests, changes in land
management, and as a consequence of climate change itself (WWF, 2000). Harvesting
is a predictable carbon release, but with time lags not so easy to assess when life cycles
of all timber and cellulose products are considered. As a rule, these various factors
make reliance on forest sinks rather uncertain and risky.
The potential reversibility of sinks embodied in forestry (or/and land use changes)
projects and the non-permanence of the stored carbon (in trees or in derived products)
requires special attention with respect to accounting. For example, one should ensure
that any credit for such enhanced carbon stocks is balanced by accounting for any
subsequent reductions in those carbon stocks, regardless of the cause.
Acquittal of credits and/or permits would then be required in the commitment period
2008–2012 where:
• there were emissions associated with deforestation in the period, and
• there were net reductions in the carbon stock of Kyoto forests in the same
period, by any means (human induced, such as harvesting or coppicing, or
through a natural event) (AGO, 1999c).
To acquit credits and/or permits for emissions in these circumstances might not
necessarily be the responsibility of the initial sequestered carbon rights owner (AGO,
1999d― see also infra, Section 5).
There are a number of existing and emerging strategies available to manage and
minimize the risk associated with sequestering carbon. For example, in the case of
‘accidental’ destruction of the carbon sink (e.g., fire and other natural hazards),
provision could be made to cover such losses by insurance. Furthermore, the
5establishment of derivative markets for carbon sink activities would allow for risk
mitigating strategies (e.g., hedging). Other strategies include planting additional trees as
a buffer and pooling, where a number of sites are aggregated through an intermediary
(AGO, 1999c). In short, investors would be able to manage risk through market
mechanisms (e.g., insurance and hedging) as well as through pooling carbon and
establishing a buffer (Blaser and Douglas, 2000).
As an alternative to strategies for ensuring indefinite sequestration, limited term
commitments to carbon sinks may offer practical and political advantages. Various
mechanisms to perpetuate these partial commitments into permanent sequestration have
been proposed (see, Chomitz, 2000).
Whatever care is taken to ensure the eligibility and full counting of removals and
emissions derived from forest management, forestry projects remain liable to a number
of uncertainties in their carbon accounting (as are any uptake or removal programs).
These cannot be ignored.4
4 Uncertainty in Carbon Accounting: A Crucial Issue
to be Dealt with by the Treaty
Uncertainties associated with the estimation of emission reductions (viz. removals) from
different sources (viz. sinks) are always likely to exist due to factors such as variability
in biological systems, problems with observing emitter activity levels and the need to
use proxies in assessing some emission/carbon pools.
Whichever is considered (fossil fuel or biospheric actions), uncertainty in carbon
accounting is an issue.5 Verification of emission reductions (on both the national
accounts and project levels) is a necessary precondition for the functioning of the
Protocol as such. Reductions have to be mutually recognized and accepted as “true” by
all participating parties (Obersteiner et al., 2000b,c). Parties can underreport emissions
just because of various uncertainties (and hence can overstate their reductions). The
reported emissions plus the estimated unreported carbon emissions should then be
below their Kyoto targets (Jonas et al., 2000). Significant increased emission reduction
costs that would result from integrating uncertainty into the reporting system could be
substantially lowered by emission trading (see a convincing international simulation in
Godal, 2000).
However, applicable concepts to quantify uncertainties have yet to be scientifically
worked out (Obersteiner et al., 2000a). It is currently proposed that the emission
reductions as well as uncertainty ranges be certified by an independent neutral third
party. At project level, the auditor could verify that an appropriate proportion of forest
carbon sequestered has been subtracted for covering uncertainties in the measurement
4 For a detailed technical description of how to determine carbon credits in forestry projects, see Harkin
and Bull (2000).
5 IIASA research has investigated in great detail issues of uncertainty in carbon accounting and has dealt
with the implications of verification, Nilsson et al. (2000).
6and projection of the forest carbon balance (Holloway, 1999; Harkin and Bull, 2000).
Alternatively or as a complement, different levels of precision associated with emission
reductions/credits could be indicated by the certification entity.6
Generally speaking, the economic solution to the verifiability problem can be achieved
by attaching an economic cost to uncertainty. Countries should be penalized for
uncertainties and they could be allowed to reduce this penalty by reducing the level of
uncertainty.7 It has been argued that uncertainty can be priced and in this way included
in a trading scheme (Obersteiner et al., 2000a). The present discussion paper develops
this viewpoint in proposing that, via the national emission trading schemes, market
appraisals (by price differentials) complement the professional uncertainty assessment
indicated above.
Since doubts are often cast especially about the ability to quantify and verify the
uncertainty in estimating carbon fluxes associated with land use changes and forestry,
such a complementary approach is worth examination in its likely future context,
namely that of emission trading markets.
5 Outline of an Emission Trading Market
and the Operators’ Liability Issue
5.1 Rationale for Introducing an Emission Trading Scheme
Apart from offering a non-prescriptive approach to greenhouse gas abatement, the
development of national markets and a connected international system for trading
emission credits is essential for reducing countries’ commitment costs. It has been early
demonstrated that the least cost solution of reaching the aggregate target of pollution
reduction agreements can be realized though trading in emission permits (Montgomery,
1972). The global costs of achieving the Kyoto Protocol targets are estimated to be US$
120 billion if each nation must satisfy its commitments purely through domestic actions,
but drop to US$ 54 billion if trading is permitted among industrialized countries and
further falls to US$ 11 billion if carbon reduction transfers from developing countries
(CERs) are permitted and efficiently supplied (Ellerman et al., 1998, quoted by
Chomitz, 2000).
5.2 Main Features of a National Emission Permit Market
On a national market, basic demand for a single tradable instrument (e.g., ‘carbon
equivalents units’ or ‘carbon credits’) originates from operators in need of emission
credits for meeting emission liabilities derived from exceeding their individual
6 For example, the forest carbon accounting standard published by the State Forests of NSW (2000) in
Australia, in conjunction with the Sydney Futures Exchange (2000a,b), defines three different levels of
precision associated with carbon credit certification.
7 An analogy can be found in, e.g., life insurance markets. A reduced rate is offered after medical
examination; otherwise a flat rate is given.
7allowable emission caps (emitters outside this ‘cap and trade’ system pay a carbon tax
or/and must comply with prescriptive mandatory measures). The supply of tradable
emission allowances comes forth from:
(i) surplus emission permits (or emission credits― ECs),
(ii) domestic (or other industrialized countries) carbon sequestration credits (CSCs),
(iii) free parts of other countries’ assigned amounts (PAAs),
(iv) emission reduction units from joint implementation projects in economies in
transition (ERUs), and
(v) certified emission reductions in developing countries (CERs) ― under the
proviso that the latter be recognized as accountable.
Emitters partaking in a ‘cap and trade’ system are required to acquit one carbon
equivalent unit for each ton of carbon dioxide emissions, or their equivalents.8 A
carbon equivalent unit (from any origin) is surrendered by the governmental regulatory
body, once the emission credit was used to authorize the emission. It is then no longer
available for trading.
In such an emission trading system, trade is assumed to occur between market
participants who have different costs and opportunities for reducing their emission
output. The emergence of an emission credit market allows emitters who have
exhausted their lower-cost abatement opportunities to buy additional emission credits at
the prevailing price. Conversely, emitters with substantial low-cost abatement
opportunities have an incentive to adopt them, and free-up permits for sale within the
market. Equalizing the costs of abatement across sources in this way is expected to
minimize the total costs of abatement (AGO, 1999a,b).9
5.3 Liabilities of Market Operators
Within a national emission trading market, carbon sink operators are supposed to
voluntarily register to be incorporated into the system. As seen above (Section 3), the
owner of the sequestered carbon is responsible for measuring, monitoring and reporting
on the sequestered carbon as well as arranging appropriate verification processes. As a
market supplier, he will remain liable for these operations.
As in any financial or commodity trading market, the carbon credits buyer is in
principle not held liable for the product; he does face risks however. As a rule, the initial
earner (supplier) of government-issued credits incurs (as project owner) a liability for
8 The total supply of emission allowances issued by a national government in any given commitment
period would need to be consistent with the country’s assigned amount, supplemented by sequestration
credit arrangements, to enable the nation to comply with its international commitments.
9 A national emission trading system is supposed to be open to all legal entities including, but not limited
to, specified emission sources and carbon sink operators. They could include private individuals,
companies, societies (which could include environmental and other non-governmental organizations),
industry groups, brokers and other service providers. The advantage of open entry of others to the market,
including those from other countries, is that it would increase the number of participants, increase
competition, and have the potential to reduce the cost of the country’s emission reductions (AGO, 1999a).
8the real carbon equivalents content that originated from his activity and hence for the
real emission allowance value of the sold rights. Should the effective acquittal value of
marketed credits reveal to be less than their face value (e.g., because of a subsequent
deforestation), the buyer could climb the sellers’ chain to the initial supplier and ask the
latter to support the possible damage cost (e.g., in the event that the control and
compliance authority would require the user of the purchased credits to acquit for non-
covered accidental emissions or any other reasons).10 For sure, a rule could establish
that whoever is responsible for emissions from sinks (the supplier) would also be
responsible for all connected costs of acquittal. Not necessarily, however, in ultimate
cases where:
(i) the supplier is unable to pay,
(ii) credits from economies in transition or developing countries are accepted by
domestic acquittal authorities only for a carbon equivalent content lower than
their face value, and as a general rule
(iii) for any other reasons that could cause the receivable acquittal value to be less
than the initial issued value (nominal value).
Credit buyers may then have difficulties to maintain that they share no product risk at
all.11
6 Differentiated Market Prices for Carbon Offsets
from Forestry Projects
As indicated in Section 3, forestry projects, as a class, do not face more difficulties than
other activities in producing greenhouse gas emission reductions that are real,
measurable, and additional. However, coverage by the initial owner of the sequestered
carbon for (1) uncertainties and risks associated to project baseline evaluation, and (2)
sink reversibility may well vary with respect to individual project features and project
owner profiles.
With reference to the liability issue analyzed in Section 5, the unique market price
(often announced by emission trading promoters) at a given time for the carbon
equivalent unit may then well prove to be unlikely in direct reference to the de facto
lack of homogeneity of the traded ‘products’. It can be assumed that the origin of the
latter (as for a number of agricultural commodities) will be taken into account by market
operators.
It can then be expected that market appraisals will differentiate accordingly. It is
suggested that price differentials be expressed in relation to the average price of one
10 More generally, should the initial supplier fail to meet any additional obligations (in the case of
accidents or other unforeseen events), the governmental regulatory body would be entitled to require the
credit holder to pay for the uncovered part of acquittals.
11 Nevertheless, the rule of the sellers’ liability is worth defending. It would build confidence in the
market in that all credits purchased by the buyers would be able, in principle, to be used to meet their
emission commitments.
9carbon equivalent unit granted for an emission reduction in fossil fuel substitution
programs. Market discounts with regard to this reference price for emission allowances
would be calculated according to standard methods within appropriate time periods
(month, quarter, etc., according to transaction frequencies).
To offer some guidance to buyers, rating agencies (similar to financial analysis entities
for stock exchange equities) could supply information related to project viability, owner
profile of the sequestered carbon rights, repute of the certification entity, reliability of
the issuing body, etc. Valuing and aggregating these various criteria could result in
publishing some kind of ‘carbon sink index’. Quotations of market discount would or
would not reflect changes in these indicators.12
7 International Reporting with Correction
(by market discounts) of the Contributive Value
of the Currently Controversial Activities for
Meeting Each Country's Assigned Amounts―
Prospects for Less Stringent Eligibility Rules
7.1 A Dual Accounting System
For ensuring a credible and smooth functioning of emission trading markets, national
compliance bodies have to consider that every certified ton is equal to 1000kg and the
same ton of carbon absorbed by a sink (whatever its origin) allows, in principle, an
equal amount of carbon to be emitted by burning fossil fuels (apart from exceptional
cases of the types referred to in Section 5).
This rule at the national level does not preclude a possible internationally agreed
convention whereby, in verifying a developed country’s compliance with its
commitments, certified declared values from (controversial) carbon sinks would be
corrected downwards by observed market discounts (as an additional measure to
quantify uncertainties and taking them into account in the compliance procedures for
ensuring that countries meet their targets within an acceptable confidence margin).
Such a dual accounting agreement would not be an innovation in the management of
international affairs. An analogy for a system that differentiates domestic/external levels
can be found in the previous international monetary system of fixed exchange rates
(when gold was exchanged between central banks at a fixed price or US$ 35 per ounce
without considering its market price).
12 A parallel could be found with the market of developing countries debts whereby discounts from their
nominal reimbursement values are quoted and show a close correlation with countries’ ratings.
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This dual accounting system implies that transactions in emission credits are trackable
and effectively tracked.13 Furthermore, a method for observing and averaging market
discounts should be agreed upon.
7.2 An International Control with Penalties for
Non-compliance and Uncertainties
With or without specific accounting rules for sinks at the international reporting level, it
has to be assumed that both an international compliance body and financial penalties
will be introduced. By how much a country is over its target (in applying the above
procedures) would be assessed by this compliance body and the penalty amount would
be decided in accordance with the penalty rate (preferably above the currently estimated
carbon price) agreed upon.
The proposed scheme would deter non-compliance, as well as allow more flexibility
with eligibility rules of controversial activities (since their contributive value might be
discounted).
Then, restrictive measures currently contemplated in some circles14 (non-acceptance of
sequestered carbon in sinks of developing countries, ‘adaptation levy’ on all Kyoto
flexible mechanisms, restrictive fixed share of countries’ assigned amounts allowed to
be covered by listed activities, etc.) would no longer be justified. This can be illustrated
by an example showing the advantages of such a discount system. Emission credits
from a controversial sink in a given location might be accounted for, e.g., only 40% of
their domestic acquittal value by the international compliance authority in the event that
markets would reveal an average 60% discount for the purchase of credits from similar
types in the same country (similar to bad debts of some developing countries that can be
purchased at such a low price in view of their poor reimbursement performances15).
Thus, market appraisals could advantageously replace activity exclusions or other
restrictions currently proposed by contradictory interests among Kyoto Parties.
8 Summary and Conclusions
Forests can be a powerful ally to man for holding off global warming and its
catastrophic consequences. However, they have this natural propensity to return to a
steady state whereby the permanence of established carbon sinks is endangered. The
13 For example, within an electronic tracking system as envisaged by the Australian Greenhouse Office
(see, AGO, 1999d).
14 See, WWF (2000): “Developing countries may be able to host sinks projects in the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM)... WWF believes these projects should not be given credit [emphasized by the author]
in the Protocol due to their impermanence and likely incentives to cut down native forests. ...The
‘adaptation levy’, a fixed charge of each trading transaction currently contemplated in the CDM, should
be extended to Emissions trading and Joint Implementation, so as to ensure a level playing field for the
three mechanisms...”.
15
…or just their low trust rating by investment agencies.
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assessment of carbon-sequestered amounts is also associated with various uncertainties.
Are these two reasons sufficient to disregard forestry activities in attempting to reduce
greenhouse gas concentrations?16 Perhaps yes, if ― with reference to bad feelings
raised by atmospheric pollution― the problem and its solution are reduced to a change
in behavior. Certainly not, if this problem is defined as multidimensional and truly
global, i.e., implying integrated responses of mankind and its environment.17
Predicating the admission of carbon sink contributions does not necessarily mean
acceptance that Kyoto participating countries be allowed to overstate their reported
reductions by accounting tricks or other loopholes. Mechanisms and procedures can be
convened at intergovernmental level, so that non-permanence and uncertainty be duly
taken into account with the view of ensuring that emission reductions are real,
additional and verifiable.
For following this strategy, a single path has been outlined in this paper, as a
complement to the currently contemplated procedures proposed ― at national and
project levels ― as a remedy to weaknesses inherent to forest carbon sinks. As
indicated in the introduction, other prospects are offered at the international level by a
qualitative hierarchization of carbon sinks and the installation of a specific market for
them (Obersteiner et al., 2001). The recent proposals share a common trait in that they
capitalize on the market ability to reveal trust or doubt appraisals about human activities
by differentiated prices.
With reference to the unit price of emission allowances for burning fossil fuels (to be
possibly chosen as standard), it can be anticipated that future transactions for carbon
offsets associated with land use change and forestry projects may reveal market
discounts due to risks and uncertainties related to the evaluation and management of
such projects. It is certainly pertinent (except in ultimate cases) not to consider these
discounts at national levels for emitters to acquit their environmental debt with carbon
credits (a State does not question its currency as legal tender). At intergovernmental
level, things can be quite different. Unconditional currency convertibility is a
convention based on mutual trust between nations.18 Instead of accepting the excessive
price for convertibility possibly reached by highly restrictive definitions, it appears
more sensible, in the international verification of results achieved by participating
countries to meet their committed targets, to satisfy oneself with a downward
adjustment of reported reductions related to controversial carbon sinks ― and this in
proportion to these market discounts.
16 Another issue not considered here (and mainly discussed in Europe) is the social controversy about the
pertinence and admission of emission trading. For an economist, such a debate discloses the lack of
gravity and urgency assigned to the problem. In global warfare, are not belligerents going to associate
willy-nilly gun-traders and bankers to the war effort?
17 On the nature of “authentic world problems” (in contradistinction to “generalized problems”), see,
Fontela and Gabus (1976).
18 On the convertibility of national emission credits and the need of a global authority for
intergovernmental settlements, see, Appendix 1.
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Such a system might develop towards more normative conversion rates, should the
smooth functioning market be considered to be impaired by all or part of the
governments’ signatories to the treaty. The inescapable distortions due to such
administered rates should most probably not be stronger than those to be expected from
the current option aiming at rationing carbon sequestration by quantitative caps (even if
minimized within appropriate market mechanisms as those proposed by Obersteiner et
al., 2001).
Even if additional environmental precautions have to be respected, forests under man’s
influence19 should only win by a better valuation of their capacity to absorb those costly
human-activity-induced gases. In a predominantly merchantable society, no effort
should be spared for these forests developing relative cost advantages for the goods and
services they produce and thus improving their financial and social returns. Is it too
ambitious to promote a strategy that delays both deforestation and global warming?
19 Are there any forests that currently escape man’s influence?
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APPENDIX 1: Difficulties for National Emission Credits
to Reach Universality
In early transactions on emission credits from pilot carbon sinks or emission reductions
certified by independent third parties, the final and distant validity of the acquired
permit is just a portion in the amount of incurred risks; this validity is part of the
anticipation game. By contrast, the acceptability of purchased rights for acquitting an
environmental debt could not tolerate any uncertainty in an established system.
In literature, emission trading is most often dealt with at either the national or
international level. In both cases, their universal character is not questioned, since it is
implicit by the definition itself of such rights as a way to reduce emission costs, either at
the domestic level (AGO, 1999a), or worldwide (Ellerman et al., 1998; Godal, 2000).
As a rule, a possible non-acceptance (by the treaty authority) of emission credits issued
by a national control entity is not evoked, although sometimes suspected (see,
Obersteiner et al., 2000c).20
Now, emission credits that would not be recognized by the control and monitoring
authority of the country where the emitter operates would be of little purpose to the
latter. The issuing function being distinct from the acquittal function, divergences in the
validity of emission credits may arise, but should be easily bridged at the national level;
it can be assumed that the delivery and compliance entities, even if institutionally
separated, report to the same public power.
Except in agreements between parties, the situation is quite different at the international
level. Acceptance (for extinguishing an environmental debt) of emission credits issued
by a non-domestic entity is as a last resort in the competence of the national control
authority where the emitter operates. Similar to a bank, this authority is not under
obligation to recognize any foreign ‘carbon offset currency’ as legal tender; this might
well be accepted, but at a discount for covering the risk of refusal by the international
authority responsible for verifying that countries’ reported emission reductions meet
with their committed targets.
This is how the ‘convertibility’ issue of national emission credits may be expected to
occur.
Similar to what is taking place for the international settlement of payments in non-
convertible currencies between central banks (cf., the role of the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel), the problems raised could find solutions within an appropriate
“global entity for the intergovernmental settlements of national emission rights”.
20
“Approximately equal partners in a CCMS [Common Carbon Markets] will find themselves more
willing to trade [emission credits]. Equality among partners in CCMS is defined by the physical and
economic behavior of the underlying carbon systems trying to reach the agreed targets. Similar to the
European monetary system, a single currency can only be successfully and sustainably established among
approximately equal partners. If the partners participating in the same market are too different the
socioeconomic system will show tendencies of disintegration”.
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Perhaps such an entity could also deal with the possible differentiation of these rights
according to their physical origin and therefore help in the acceptance of carbon credits
originating from forest sinks. With this problem distinct from the convertibility of
national permits, we are back to the central issue of this document.
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Defined by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) as “planting
of new forests on land which historically
has not been covered by forest".
assigned amounts
Under the Kyoto Protocol, each
industrialized nation is allocated an
“assigned amount” of greenhouse gases
for the 2008–2012 commitment period.
Assigned amounts represent what a
country can legally release during the
five-year period; hence above-the-line
emissions are committed to be reduced.
carbon budget
The balance of the exchanges (uptake
and release) of carbon between carbon
reservoirs (e.g., atmosphere and
biosphere) in the carbon cycle.
carbon certification
The process by which properly qualified
independent entities certify that the
claimed carbon has been sequestered.
carbon credit
Carbon credits would be issued to
owners of sequestered carbon based on
the amount of carbon sequestered.
Carbon credits would authorize the
emissions of a specified mass of CO2
equivalent gas over a specified time. In
this respect, they are identical to
emission permits.
carbon sink
A pool (reservoir) that absorbs or takes
up released carbon from another part of
the carbon cycle.
carbon tax
Tax on fossil fuels proportional to the
carbon content of each fuel.
clean development mechanism
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol provides
for the clean development mechanism
whereby developed countries are able to
invest in emission reducing projects in
developing countries to obtain credits to
assist in meeting their assigned amounts.
The details of the clean development
mechanism have yet to be negotiated at an
international level. It should allow
countries to use credits obtained from the
year 2000 for the purposes of meeting
their assigned amounts. Participation is
voluntary, and open to private and public
entities alike on a Party approved basis.
CO2-e (CO2 equivalent)
Non-CO2 gases are converted into CO2-e
terms by multiplying the amount of gas by
the appropriate global warming potential.
deforestation
Defined by the IPCC as “conversion of
land from forests or grasslands to pasture,
crop land or other managed uses”.
emissions
The release of gases from industrial
processes and vehicles as well as by living
organisms.
emission permit
An authorization, license, or equivalent
control document issued by an approved
agency or government to implement the
requirements of an environmental
regulation.
greenhouse effect
The warming of the Earth’s atmosphere
caused by a build up of carbon dioxide and
other gases. Many scientists believe that
this effect is being significantly enhanced
through various human activities (however
they do not necessarily exclude
enhancements by solar activities).
21 Partly reproduced from AGO (1999c).
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greenhouse gases (GHG)
Those gaseous constituents of the
atmosphere, both natural and
anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit
infra red radiation.
hedging
Take a position (i.e., buy or sell) in the
future market as a means of reducing the
risk of price fluctuation in the physical
market.
international emissions trading
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows
developed countries to participate in
emission trading for the purposes of
meeting their assigned amounts.
However, it is required that any such
trading shall be supplemental to
domestic actions for the purpose of
meeting quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments. As with the
other Kyoto flexibility mechanisms,
participation in emission trading is
voluntary for Parties, and open to private
and public entities alike on a Party
approved basis.
Kyoto forest
Allowable sink activities under the
Kyoto Protocol which are presently
confined to forest related activities
specifically afforestation, reforestation
and deforestation since 1990.
reforestation
Defined by the IPCC as “planting of
forests on land which historically has
contained forest but which has been used
for another purpose since last being
covered by forest.”
sequestration
Processes that remove carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere and retain it (for
some time) in a carbon sink (i.e., trees).
sink
Any process, activity or mechanism,
which removes a greenhouse gas, an
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas
from the atmosphere.
sink verification
The periodic auditing of sequestered
carbon data recorded by the sequestered
carbon rights owner or an agent.
sources
Any process, activity or mechanism,
which releases a greenhouse gas, an
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas
into the atmosphere.
steady state
Where the carbon uptake and release are
more or less in balance.
value
acquittal/settlement value
Amount of carbon equivalents units
accepted by the national control authority
for acquitting emissions not covered by
allocated quotas, independently from the
initial “nominal value” or “face value”.
‘contributive’ value
Amount of carbon equivalents units
retained by the intergovernmental
authority responsible for the verification of
the country’s reporting in compliance with
its commitments. This unit amount can be
less than the “acquittal value” at the
national level with reference to agreed
procedures for adjusting credits with
controversial origins.
nominal/face value
Amount of carbon equivalents units
indicated on the document extending
emission credits/rights to its holder, as
initially approved by the national issuing
authority.
